THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


MAJOR-GENERAL    JOHN    M.    SCHOFIELD.       (FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH.) 


WAS  GENERAL  THOMAS 

'  SLOW  AT  NASHVILLE? 

WITH   A  DESCRIPTION   OF 

Tbe  Greatest  Cavalry  Movement 
oftbe  War 


GENERAL  JAMES  H.  WILSON'S  CAVALRY  OPERATIONS 
IN  TENNESSEE,  ALABAMA,  AND  GEORGIA 


HENRY  V.  BOYNTON 

Brevet  Brig.  Gen.  U.  S.  V.;  Historian  Chickamauga. 
and  Chattanooga  National  Park  Commission 


NEW  YORK 

FRANCIS  P.   HARPER 
1896 


COPYRIGHTED,  1896, 

BY 

FRANCIS  P.   HARPER. 


EDITION  LIMITED  TO 
45o  COPIES. 


PREFACE. 


A  RECENT  revival  of  the  venerable 

oa     charge     that     General     George     H. 

Thomas  was  slow  at  Nashville  led  to 

§!     the  publication,  in  the  New  York  Sun 

w     of  August  9,  1896,  of  the  article  which 

> 

•i     is  here  reproduced  by  the  permission 

of  that  journal.     A  few  brief  additions 

d     have  been  made  to  the  original  text. 

o 

^         It  seemed   the   more  important  to 

0  some  of  the  veterans  of  the  Army  of 
OQ 

01  the  Cumberland  that  this  charge  in  its 
S      renewed  form  should  be  met,  because 
<  3 


447938 


4  Preface. 

it  was  put  forth  with  a  show  of  official 
authority  which  would  naturally  give 
it  weight  with  readers  who  were  not 
familiar  with  the  war  records. 

The  discussion  of  the  subject  also 
afforded  an  opportunity  to  present, 
though  in  very  concise  form,  the  out- 
lines of  those  magnificent  cavalry 
operations  under  General  James  H. 
Wilson  in  the  battle  of  Nashville,  and 
in  his  subsequent  independent  cam- 
paign through  Alabama  and  Georgia, 
all  of  which  were  without  parallel  in 
our  war. 

Though  these  movements  constitute 
one  of  the  most  brilliant  chapters  in 
our  war  history, — in  fact,  in  the  his- 
tory of  cavalry  in  any  war, — the 
country  really  knows  little  about 


Preface.  5 

them,  because  they  were  performed 
out  of  sight  in  Alabama  and  Georgia, 
while  the  attention  of  the  country  was 
fixed  upon  the  fall  of  Richmond  and 
the  great  events  immediately  follow- 
ing it.  For  this  reason  it  is  believed 
that  the  brief  story  here  presented 
will  not  be  without  interest. 

H.  V.  B. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  CM  September,  1896. 


WAS  GENERAL   THOMAS  SLOW 
AT  NASHVILLE? 


NEW  generation  has  come 
upon  the  stage  since  our 
civil  war.  It  has  its  own 
writers  on  the  events  of 
that  struggle.  Some  of  these,  careful 
students  as  they  are,  make  proper 
and  effective  use  of  the  stores  of 
material  which  the  Government  has 
collected  and  published.  Others, 
stumbling  upon  interesting  dispatches 
7 


8  General  George  H.  Thomas 

of  notable  campaigns,  read  them  in 
connection  with  the  ill-considered  and 
hasty  criticisms  of  the  hot  times  which 
brought  them  forth,  and,  finding  ques- 
tions settled  twenty  years  ago,  but  en- 
tirely new  to  themselves,  they  proceed 
to  reveal  them  as  new  things  to  the 
new  generation.  By  this  process  it  has 
recently  been  announced  that  General 
Thomas  was  slow  at  Nashville.  To 
give  this  echo  of  thirty-two  years  ago 
sufficient  voice,  several  columns  of 
dispatches — which  a  quarter  of  a 
century  since  formed  the  basis  of 
discussions  that  demolished  the 
theory  they  are  now  brought  forward 
to  sustain — are  gravely  presented  as 
something  new. 

Nothing  better  illustrates  this  situa- 


At  Nashville.  9 

tion  than  the  very  familiar  story  of 
the  Irishman  who  assaulted  the  Jew 
for  the  part  he  took  in  the  Crucifixion, 
and  upon  being  remonstrated  with 
upon  the  ground  that  the  event 
occurred  eighteen  hundred  years  ago, 
replied  that  it  was  nevertheless  new 
to  him,  as  he  had  only  heard  of  it  the 
day  before. 

That  General  Thomas  was  not  slow 
at  Nashville  is  ancient  history.  Gen- 
eral Grant,  who  was  the  first  to 
charge  it,  was  also  the  first  to  with- 
draw the  imputation,  by  declaring  in 
his  official  report  that  at  the  time  he 
had  been  very  impatient  over  what 
appeared  as  unnecessary  delay  on  the 
part  of  Thomas,  "but  his  final  defeat 
of  Hood  was  so  complete  that  it  will 


io  General  George  H.  Thomas 

be  accepted  as  a  vindication  of  that 
distinguished  officer's  judgment." 

The  ostensible  reason  for  heralding 
Thomas  as  slow — so  slow,  indeed,  as 
to  require  his  removal  and  lead  to  an 
order  for  it — was  that  he  insisted  upon 
concentrating  his  infantry  force  and 
remounting  his  cavalry.  Secretary 
Stanton  declared  that  the  delay  would 
be  till  doomsday  if  Thomas  waited  for 
the  latter. 

A  consideration  of  this  most  impor- 
tant, underlying,  and  controlling  fac- 
tor in  General  Thomas's  preparations 
brings  up  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
chapters  in  our  war  history,  and  alto- 
gether the  most  brilliant  in  the  annals 
of  cavalry  operations. 

In  touching  upon  General  Thomas's 


At  Nashv  ille.  1 1 

persistence  in  getting  his  cavalry 
ready,  it  would  be  very  natural  for  a 
surface  student  to  quote  Secretary 
Stanton:  "If  he  waits  for  Wilson  to 
get  ready,  Gabriel  will  be  blowing  his 
last  horn,"  and  treat  it  as  conclusive 
proof  of  Thomas's  dilatoriness  and 
Stanton's  final  opinion.  But  just  far 
enough  under  the  surface  to  escape 
the  eyes  of  historical  amateurs,  lies 
the  splendid  and  unparalleled  fact  that 
in  eight  winter  days  after  the  date  of 
that  dispatch  General  James  H.  Wil- 
son, Thomas's  chief  of  cavalry,  had 
impressed  horses  enough,  with  those 
furnished  on  previous  requisitions,  to 
raise  the  effective  mounted  force  at 
Nashville  from  5500  to  13,500,  and 
that  on  the  eighth  day  General  Wilson 


12  General  George  H.  Thomas 

went  into  action  with  12,000  mounted 
men,  and  had  besides  one  brigade  of 
1500  men  engaged  in  an  independent 
movement. 

At  this  point  a  moment's  considera- 
tion of  the  real  reasons  which  caused 
the  outbreak  against  General  Thomas, 
on  the  ground  that  he  was  slow,  will 
not  be  out  of  place.  At  City  Point  it 
was  the  perfectly  natural  but  sicken- 
ing anxiety  lest  it  should  turn  out  that 
a  great  mistake  had  been  made  in  let- 
ting Sherman  march  away  to  the  sea, 
thus  possibly  opening  the  way  for 
Hood  to  the  Ohio.  At  Savannah  it 
was  the  same  fear,  intensified  by  the 
consciousness  that  Thomas  had  been 
left  with  unprepared  forces  to  con- 
tend against  a  veteran  army  which 


At  Nashville.  13 

had  stubbornly  resisted  both  Thomas 
and  Sherman  during  the  hundred  days 
from  Dalton  to  Atlanta. 

And  so,  while  Thomas,  as  all  who 
were  on  the  ground  knew,  was  mak- 
ing superhuman  exertions  to  prepare 
fully  for  the  task  in  hand,  he  was 
advised  to  fight,  pressed  to  fight, 
ordered  to  fight,  threatened  with  re- 
moval if  he  did  not  fight,  and  his 
successor  dispatched  to  relieve  him. 
And  the  underlying  cause  of  it  all  was 
the  demoralizing  fear  that  Hood 
might  elude  or  overthrow  Thomas  and 
strike  for  the  Ohio,  and  the  country 
rise  in  wrath  to  inquire  why  Sher- 
man, with  62,000  thoroughly  equipped 
veterans,  including  a  larger  force  of 
mounted  men  than  he  left  behind, 


14  General  George  H.   Thomas 

had  been  allowed  to  march  away  from 
the  central  theater  of  war.  So  great 
was  this  fear  at  Savannah  that  even 
after  receiving  Thomas's  dispatch 
giving  an  account  of  the  first  day's 
battle  at  Nashville,  which  resulted  in 
driving  Hood's  left  eight  miles  (which 
movement  General  Grant  character- 
ized as  a  "splendid  success"),  Sher- 
man telegraphed  that  this  attack  on 
Hood  "was  successful  but  not  com- 
plete": that  he  awaited  further  ac- 
counts "with  anxiety,"  as  Thomas's 
complete  success  was  necessary  to 
vindicate  his  own  plan  for  this  cam- 
paign. 

Throughout  all  this  inside  panic  in 
high  official  circles,  only  Thomas  and 
the  trusted  officers  who  supported 


At  Nashville.  15 

him  at  Nashville  were  cool  and  un- 
moved in  the  memorable  crisis. 

THOMAS   ORGANIZING    HIS   ARMY. 

The  concentration  and  organiza- 
tion of  the  fragments  which  finally 
made  up  the  force  with  which  he 
practically  annihilated  his  enemy  was 
one  of  the  most  remarkable  accom- 
plishments of  the  war.  It  was  pros- 
ecuted and  consummated  in  the 
immediate  presence  of  the  enemy, 
and  a  large  portion  of  the  work  was 
performed  during  the  continued 
movement,  constant  skirmishing,  fre- 
quent affairs,  and  one  great  battle  of 
an  active  campaign. 

Arriving  at  Nashville,  the  first  point 


1 6  General  George  H.  Thomas 

of  concentration,  General  Thomas, 
after  careful  study  of  the  situation, 
decided  upon  his  plan  of  battle.  It 
included,  as  one  of  its  essentials,  the 
remounting  of  an  effective  force  of 
cavalry.  From  the  moment  his  plans 
were  formed  the  utmost  energy  was 
put  forth  to  prepare  for  their  execu- 
tion. Greater  or  more  effective  ac- 
tivity was  never  exerted  in  the  Union 
army  than  was  manifest  at  Nashville 
throughout  this  period.  Every  stroke 
of  effort  was  directed  toward  the  pre- 
determined end,  with  the  result  which 
the  country  knows. 

Naturally,  the  part  played  by  the 
cavalry  in  our  great  battles  was  often 
concealed  or  minimized,  while  the 
infantry  operations  filled  the  public 


At  Nashville.  17 

eye  and  for  the  time  dimmed  the 
credit  due  to  the  cavalry  arm.  The 
history  of  the  war  does  not  afford 
another  case  where  the  cavalry 
formed  the  determining  factor,  and, 
notwithstanding  this,  where  it  was  so 
largely  overlooked  in  the  distribution 
of  the  honors. 

It  is  necessary  to  a  full  understand- 
ing of  the  brilliancy,  efficiency,  and 
completeness  of  Thomas's  final  move- 
ments to  have  in  mind  the  situation 
after  General  Sherman  had  marched 
away  from  Hood  and  left  Thomas  in 
Tennessee  to  stand  between  that  vet- 
eran Confederate  army  and  the  Ohio. 

Preparatory  to  the  march  to  the 
sea  the  great  army  about  Atlanta  had 
been  carefully  inspected  both  as  to 


1 8  General  George  H.  Tbomas 

men  and  equipments.  Every  weak 
man,  all  convalescents,  those  whose 
terms  of  service  were  expiring — in 
short,  all  the  ''trash,"  as  General 
Sherman  expressed  it — were  sent  to 
the  rear,  that  is,  to  Thomas.  All 
equipments  of  infantry,  artillery,  and 
cavalry  were  examined,  and  every 
weak  or  worn  piece  replaced  by  new, 
and  all  the  "trash"  either  destroyed 
or  "sent  to  Thomas."  The  entire 
cavalry  force  was  dismounted  for 
close  inspection  and  for  the  perfect 
remounting  of  Kilpatrick's  column. 
Of  the  sound  men  whom  Thomas  re- 
ceived he  lost  15,000  by  expiration 
of  terms  of  service  and  previous  fur- 
loughs to  vote,  within  a  week  after 
Hood's  movement  began. 


At  Nashville.  19 

After  this  sifting  of  the  armies 
General  Sherman  started  for  the  sea 
with  62,000  veterans,  of  whom  he 
wrote  that  "all  on  this  exhibit  may 
be  assumed  to  have  been  able-bodied, 
experienced  soldiers,  well  armed,  well 
equipped  and  provided,  so  far  as 
human  foresight  could,  with  all  the 
essentials  of  life,  strength,  and  vigor- 
ous action."  With  this  force  was  in- 
cluded the  entire  equipment  of  trains, 
pontoons,  and  similar  essentials  which 
Thomas,  with  great  care,  had  per- 
fected for  the  army  of  the  Cumber- 
land. Thomas's  request  that  he 
might  have  his  old  corps  which  he 
had  organized,  which  had  fought 
under  him  so  long,  was  refused,  and, 
instead,  two  small  corps  were  sent  him. 


20  Central  George  H.  Thomas 

The  nucleus  around  which  General 
Thomas  was  to  organize  an  army  to 
take  care  of  Hood — who  from  May 
till  November  had  taxed  the  offensive 
resources  of  Sherman's  three  armies — 
was,  the  Fourth  Corps,  General 
Stanley,  with  an  effective  force  of 
J3>9°7>  ar>d  the  Twenty-third,  General 
Schofield,  with  10,358  effectives. 

The  means  of  holding  Chattanooga 
are  indicated  by  the  instructions  from 
Sherman  to  Steedman,  whose  troops 
had  almost  dwindled  away  by  expira- 
tion of  service:  "You  must  organize 
and  systematize  the  hospitals  and 
men  sent  back  to  Chattanooga.  You 
could  use  some  of  them  for  your 
forts,"  and  it  was  suggested  to 
Thomas:  "To  make  things  sure,  you 


At  Nashille.  21 

might  call  upon  the  Governors  of 
Kentucky  and  Indiana  for  some 
militia,  cautioning  them  against  a 
stampede."  Thomas  was  so  short  of 
men  that  when  Steedman  asked  for 
enough  for  a  small  but  important 
garrison,  he  was  obliged  to  reply: 
"You  might  send  a  force  from  the 
organization  of  convalescents  now 
being  made  up  by  General  Cruft  at 
Chattanooga."  To  which  Steedman 
replied,  "So  far,  all  such  detach- 
ments reported  from  the  front  [Sher- 
man] are  with  furloughs,  and  are 
waiting  transportation  home." 

In  place  of  the  15,000  veterans 
whose  terms  had  expired,  Thomas 
received  12,000  newly  enlisted  re- 
cruits. General  A.  J.  Smith's  vet- 


22  General  George  H.  Thomas 

eran  corps  had  been  ordered  from 
Missouri,  and  a  great  parade  has  been 
made  of  this  fact  by  those  whose 
interest  it  was  to  show  that  Thomas 
had  been  left  with  a  competent 
force.  But  the  fact  that  it  did 
not  arrive  at  Nashville  till  after  the 
battle  of  Franklin,  and  that  Thomas 
was  waiting  for  it  as  well  as  to  re- 
mount the  cavalry,  was  not  so  loudly 
proclaimed. 

However,  when  Sherman  was  ready 
to  start  for  the  sea,  with  Hood's 
veteran  army  concentrated  behind 
him,  and  Thomas,  with  the  above 
mentioned  elements  of  an  army  scat- 
tered over  a  territory  as  large  as 
France,  had  been  assigned  to  take 
care  of  Hood,  General  Sherman 


At  Nastimlle.  «3 

telegraphed  Halleck:  "I  therefore 
feel  no  uneasiness  as  to  Tennessee, 
and  have  ordered  Thomas  to  assume 
the  offensive  in  the  direction  of 
Selma,  Ala."  And  General  Grant, 
after  receiving  some  inflated  figures 
of  a  great  force  left  with  Thomas, 
telegraphed  Sherman:  "With  the 
force  you  have  left  with  Thomas,  he 
must  be  able  to  take  care  of  Hood 
and  destroy  him."  Later,  when  the 
anxiety  at  City  Point  referred  to  in 
the  opening  of  this  paper  had  become 
intense,  the  margin  of  force  with 
which  General  Thomas  was  really 
operating  was  found  to  be  so  small 
that  General  Grant  suggested  that  he 
should  "  arm  and  put  in  the  trenches 
your  quartermaster  employees,  citi- 


24  General  George  H.  Thomas 

zens,  etc.,"  and  again,  a  few  hours 
later,  he  was  suggesting  what  he 
could  do  "with  your  citizen  em- 
ployees armed." 

CONCENTRATING  IN  FRONT  OF  HOOD. 

It  was  under  such  circumstances 
and  conditions  which,  after  all,  are 
but  faintly  shadowed  forth  by  the 
facts  here  stated,  that  General 
Thomas  began  to  concentrate  his 
conglomerate  forces  in  Hood's  front, 
and  begin  under  fire  the  work  of  or- 
ganizing and  refitting  an  army.  With 
superhuman  effort,  and  such  loyal 
assistance  and  energy  from  officers 
and  soldiers  as  were  not  elsewhere 
exhibited  during  the  war,  because  not 
previously  required,  General  Thomas 


At  Nashville.  25 

set  about  the  task  of  preparing  the 
means  of  overthrowing  Hood.  De- 
liberate action  and  the  extreme  of 
prudence  were  essentials  of  the  situa- 
tion. The  objective  of  Hood's  cam- 
paign, under  suggestions  from 
President  Davis,  was  the  Ohio  River. 
There  was  no  reserve  force  in  sight 
or  within  summoning  distance,  or 
immediately  available  anywhere  in 
case  of  reverses.  Thomas  could  not 
afford  to  take  the  slightest  risks  so 
long  as  his  own  position  was  not  im- 
perilled. It  was  not  alone  the  imme- 
diate interests  confided  to  his  keeping 
and  defense  which  hinged  upon  his 
success  or  failure,  but  both  Grant  and 
Sherman  and  possibly  the  Union  itself 
were  to  stand  or  fall  with  such  sue- 


26  General  George  H.  Thomas 

cess  or  failure.  Had  Hood  suc- 
ceeded, as  at  the  first  he  might  have 
succeeded  without  fault  of  Thomas, 
or  even  fair  ground  for  reflection 
upon  him,  what  would  have  been  said 
of  Sherman  for  marching  off  to  the 
sea,  leaving  the  central  West  without 
sufficient  protection,  or  of  General 
Grant  for  having  allowed  him  to  go  ? 

And  because  the  deliberate,  pru- 
dent, imperturbable,  and  always  sue- 
cessful  Thomas  appreciated  the 
situation,  and  determined  to  be  ready 
to  annihilate  his  enemy  before  he 
struck,  he  was  hastily  declared  to  be 
slow  by  those  he  was  preparing  to  save. 

All  of  General  Thomas's  troubles 
at  Nashville  arose  from  his  adhering, 
in  the  face  of  threatened  removal,  to 


Ai  Nashville.  27 

plans  of  action  which  made  General 
Wilson's  cavalry  an  essential  factor 
in  the  attack  on  Hood  for  which  he 
was  energetically  preparing.  He  was 
looking  not  only  to  attack,  but  to 
crushing  pursuit.  In  view  of  the 
great  preponderance  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  which  was  then  double  his 
own,  and  led  by  Forrest,  one  of  the 
ablest  cavalry  generals  on  either  side, 
effective  pursuit  without  a  strong 
mounted  force  would  be  impossible. 
The  correspondence  with  Grant — 
which  grew  until  an  order  was  issued 
for  General  Thomas's  relief  by  Gen- 
eral Schofield,  and,  when  this  was 
held  in  abeyance,  until  a  second  order 
for  superseding  him  with  General 
Logan — began  with  an  order  from 


28  General  George  H.  Thomas 

Grant  not  to  "let  Forrest  get  off 
without  punishment."  As  Forrest's 
mounted  force  was  double  Wilson's, 
this  was  easier  to  write  than  to 
execute.  General  Thomas  therefore 
explained  the  situation  fully,  showing 
that  the  cavalry  of  Hatch  and  Grier- 
son,  which  were  all  the  reinforcements 
he  had  to  depend  upon  at  first,  had  been 
turned  in  at  Memphis;  that  half  his 
own  cavalry  had  been  dismounted  to 
equip  Kilpatrick's  column  for  Sherman; 
that  his  dismounted  force,  which  he  had 
sent  to  Louisville  for  horses  and  arms, 
was  detained  there  waiting  for  both, 
and  that  as  he  was  greatly  outnum- 
bered both  in  infantry  and  cavalry  he 
would  be  compelled  to  act  on  the 
defensive.  But  he  added,  in  closing: 


At  Nashville.  29 

"  The  moment  I  can  get  my  cavalry, 
I  will  march  against  Hood,  and  if 
Forrest  can  be  reached  he  shall  be 
punished." 

The  day  after  General  Schofield's 
brilliant  and  effective  battle  at  Frank- 
lin, Thomas  made  known  to  Halleck 
his  confidence  that  Hood  could  not 
cross  the  Cumberland,  and  therefore 
thought  it  best  to  wait  until  Wilson 
could  equip  his  cavalry,  as  he  then 
felt  certain  he  could  whip  Hood. 
Next,  the  President,  through  Sec- 
retary Stanton,  stirred  General  Grant 
up  by  a  telegram  stating  that  Mr. 
Lincoln  felt  "solicitous  about  the 
disposition  of  Thomas  to  lay  in  fortifi- 
cations for  an  indefinite  period,  '  until 
Wilson  gets  equipments.'  " 


3°  General  George  H.   Thomas 

THE    PANIC    AT    WASHINGTON. 

In  spite  of  the  plainest  statements 
of  the  situation,  of  the  great  dis- 
parity of  forces,  of  the  dictates  of 
prudence  to  remain  on  the  defensive 
until  he  could  strike  an  effective  blow, 
which  he  expected  to  deliver  in  a  few 
days,  Thomas  was  prodded  and  nagged 
from  City  Point  and  Washington  as 
no  officer  in  command  of  an  army  had 
been  before,  and  treated  day  by  day 
as  if  he  needed  tutelage.  In  the  last 
dispatch  of  the  series  of  clear  explana- 
tions,— which  under  other  circum- 
stances than  the  seething  of  that  inside 
panic  which  a  full  appreciation  of  the 
complications  that  Sherman's  march 
to  the  sea  had  caused  would  doubt- 


At  Nashville.  31 

less  have  been  accepted, — General 
Thomas  was  peremptorily  ordered  to 
"attack  Hood  at  once  without  waiting 
for  a  remount  of  your  cavalry.  There 
is  great  danger  in  delay  resulting  in 
a  campaign  back  to  the  Ohio."  This 
was  sent  in  reply  to  a  telegram  of 
Thomas  showing  that  there  was  the 
greatest  activity  in  getting  the  cav- 
alry ready,  and  he  hoped  to  have  it 
remounted  "in  three  days  from  this 
time."  To  this  Thomas  replied  that 
he  would  make  all  dispositions  and 
attack  according  to  orders,  adding, 
"  though  I  believe  it  will  be  hazardous 
with  the  small  force  of  cavalry  now  at 
my  service."  Orders  to  prepare  for 
attack  were  immediately  sent  out,  and 
dispositions  for  the  attack  began. 


32  General  George  H.  Thomas 

Meantime  a  sleet  storm  came  on 
which  covered  the  country  with  a 
glaze  of  ice  over  which  neither  horses, 
men,  nor  artillery  could  move  even  on 
level  ground,  to  say  nothing  of  assault- 
ing an  enemy  intrenched  on  the  hills. 
The  same  day  Halleck  telegraphed: 
"  If  you  wait  till  General  Wilson 
mounts  all  his  cavalry  you  will  wait  till 
doomsday,  for  the  waste  equals  the 
supply."  And  General  Grant  tele- 
graphed orders  relieving  Thomas. 
The  latter  telegraphed  Halleck  that  he 
was  conscious  of  having  done  every- 
thing possible  to  prepare  the  troops 
to  attack,  and  if  he  was  removed  he 
would  submit  without  a  murmur. 

The  order  of  relief  was  suspended. 
The   sleet   storm   continued.     All   of 


At  Nasbville.  33 

General  Thomas's  officers  agreed  that 
it  was  impracticable  to  attack.  Some 
of  them  even  found  it  impossible  to 
ride  to  headquarters  because  of  the 
ice,  and  in  the  midst  of  it  came  an 
order  from  Grant:  "  I  am  in  hopes  of 
receiving  a  dispatch  from  you  to-day 
announcing  you  have  moved.  Delay  no 
longer  for  weather  or  reinforcements. " 

Thomas  replied: 

"  I  will  obey  the  order  as  promptly 
as  possible,  however  much  I  regret  it, 
as  the  attack  will  have  to  be  made 
under  every  disadvantage.  The  whole 
country  is  covered  with  a  perfect  sheet 
of  ice  and  sleet,  and  it  is  with  diffi- 
culty the  troops  are  able  to  move 
about  on  level  ground." 

To  Halleck,  Thomas  replied: 


34  General  George  H.  Thomas 

"I  have  the  troops  ready  to  make 
the  attack  on  the  enemy  as  soon  as 
the  sleet  which  now  covers  the  ground 
has  melted  sufficiently  to  enable  the 
men  to  march,  as  the  whole  country 
is  now  covered  with  a  sheet  of  ice  so 
hard  and  slippery  that  it  is  utterly 
impossible  for  troops  to  ascend  the 
slopes,  or  even  move  upon  level 
ground  in  anything  like  order.  Under 
these  circumstances  I  believe  an  at- 
tack at  this  time  would  only  result 
in  a  useless  sacrifice  of  life." 

The  reply  to  this,  unquestionably 
born  of  the  panic  to  which  allusion 
has  been  made,  was  an  order  sending 
General  Logan  to  relieve  Thomas. 
Grant  himself  then  started  from  City 
Point  for  Nashville  to  assume  general 


At  Nashville.  35 

command.  But  the  ice  having  melted, 
he  was  met  at  Washington  by  the  news 
of  Thomas's  victory. 

The  delay  that  Thomas  had  insisted 
upon,  in  the  face  of  orders  twice 
given  for  his  relief,  gave  him  the 
cavalry  force  he  required  for  the  de- 
cisive blow  he  intended  to  strike. 

While  the  official  inside  at  City 
Point  and  Washington  bordered  on 
panic,  everything  at  Nashville  was 
being  pressed  forward  with  activity 
and  vigilance,  and  at  the  same  time 
with  deliberation,  prudence,  and  the 
utmost  imperturbability.  At  length, 
and  at  the  first  moment  possible  con- 
sistent with  a  reasonable  expectation 
of  success,  the  attack  began. 


36  General  George  H.  Thomas 

THE   ATTACK   ON    HOOD. 

The  developments  of  the  battle,  the 
energy  and  success  of  the  pursuit,  and 
the  marvelous  results  of  the  whole, 
namely,  the  virtual  destruction  of  a 
veteran  army,  reveal  at  every  step 
what  General  Thomas  had  in  mind 
when  he  insisted  upon  waiting  till  he 
could  remount  his  cavalry. 

In  no  other  battle  of  the  war  did 
cavalry  play  such  a  prominent  part 
as  in  that  of  Nashville.  In  no  other 
pursuit  did  it  so  distinguish  itself. 
Students  of  the  movement  will  find 
themselves  constantly  questioning,  as 
their  investigations  proceed,  whether, 
with  the  force  of  infantry  which 
General  Thomas  had  been  able  to 


At  Nashville.  37 

gather,  Hood  could  have  been  driven 
from  his  position  in  front  of  Nash- 
ville without  the  co-operation  of  the 
cavalry.  Had  Thomas  been  obliged 
to  fight  without  it,  as  the  authorities 
at  City  Point  and  Washington  tried  to 
compel  him  to  do,  it  is  no  reflection 
upon  his  infantry  to  say  that  there  is 
ground  for  serious  doubt  as  to  the  re- 
sult. Hood  was  intrenched  on  strong 
ground.  His  positions  were  com- 
manding. The  infantry  force  against 
him  was  not  sufficient  in  numbers  and 
experience  to  make  up  for  the  usual 
difference  due  to  field  works  placed  as 
Hood's  were  and  manned  by  veterans. 
Unquestionably  Wilson's  cavalry  was 
the  dominating  and  controlling  ele- 
ment of  the  battle.  To  say  this  does 


447938 


38  General  George  H.  Thomas 

not  detract  from  the  distinguished  in- 
fantry generals  or  their  excellent  and 
brilliant  work.  But  General  Thomas's 
plan  turned  on  cavalry  work  as  its 
directrix.  His  consultations  with 
General  Wilson  had  been  exhaustive. 
That  officer  was  charged  with  re- 
organizing, remounting,  and  refitting 
a  great  cavalry  force,  even  as  Thomas 
was  organizing  a  new  army — under 
fire.  There  had  been  nothing  like 
either  of  those  herculean  tasks  in  any 
campaign. 

Many  officers  have  organized  and 
built  up  an  effective  cavalry  force  in 
times  of  rest  and  peace,  but  no  one 
except  General  Wilson  ever  did  it  in 
the  heat  and  hurry  of  a  desperate  mid- 
winter campaign.  And  he  could  not 


At  Nashville.  39 

have  succeeded,  nor  could  any  man 
have  accomplished  it,  in  the  face 
of  the  interferences  which  were  at- 
tempted, but  for  the  protection  and 
support  of  the  peerless  and  imper- 
turbable Thomas. 

When  General  Thomas  felt  himself 
to  be  ready,  or  so  nearly  ready  that 
he  believed  success  attainable,  he  de- 
livered the  battle  of  Nashville.  In 
his  whole  career  he  had  never  struck 
a  blow  till  he  felt  himself  ready.  He 
looked  upon  the  lives  of  his  soldiers 
as  a  sacred  trust,  not  to  be  carelessly 
imperiled.  Whenever  he  moved  to 
battle,  it  was  certain  that  everything 
had  been  done  that  prudence,  deliber- 
ation, thought,  and  cool  judgment 
could  do  under  surrounding  circum- 


4°  General  George  H.  Tbomas 

stances  to  insure  success  commensu- 
rate with  the  cost  of  the  lives  of  men. 
And  so  it  came  to  pass  that  when  the 
war  ended  it  could  be  truthfully 
written  of  Thomas  alone  that  he  never 
lost  a  movement  or  a  battle. 

It  was  an  unprecedented  array  for 
attack.  The  inner  lines  about  the 
city  were  held  by  quartermasters' 
employees.  Half  the  outer,  or  main 
line,  was  manned  mostly  by  convales- 
cents and  new  troops;  the  other,  or 
right  of  this  line,  was  occupied  by 
General  A.  J.  Smith's  division.  Steed- 
man's  provisional  division  and  his  two 
colored  brigades  were  on  the  extreme 
left  of  the  front,  and  opened  the 
battle.  The  order  of  infantry  in  the 
line  from  right  to  left  was  Smith's 


At  Nashville.  41 

Corps  (Thirteenth),  Wood's  Corps 
(Fourth),  Schofield's  Corps  (Twenty- 
third),  and  Steedman's  troops. 

THE  CAVALRY  IN  THE  BATTLE. 

Wilson's  cavalry  was  massed  behind 
the  extreme  right.  Steedman,  on  the 
left,  early  December  15,  delivered  a 
vigorous  and  successful  attack.  It 
was  in  the  nature  of  a  feint.  Mean- 
time the  grand  play  with  the  cavalry 
began.  Its  part  was  the  imposing 
swinging  movement  of  12,000  mounted 
men  against  and  around  the  Con- 
federate left.  Before  the  short,  lower- 
ing winter  day  had  closed,  this  force 
had  overrun  several  redoubts  on  the 
enemy's  left,  capturing  them  and  their 
artillery  by  assaults,  swept  for  eight 


42  General  George  H.  Tbotnas 

miles  over  ground  of  formidable 
natural  difficulties,  and  forced  itself 
to  the  immediate  flank  and  rear  of 
Hood's  main  line  of  works.  It  rode 
to  its  firing  lines  and  fought  dis- 
mounted. 

The  enemy's  left  being  thus  effect, 
ually  turned,  the  infantry  attack  in 
front  was  delivered  with  success,  and 
Hood  fell  back  to  a  new  line,  and 
early  the  second  day  withdrew  still 
further,  establishing  his  right  on  the 
Overton  Hills. 

The  second  day  was  a  repetition  of 
the  first.  Wilson  again  swung  his 
cavalry  by  a  wide  detour  to  the 
enemy's  left  and  rear,  and  from  the 
rear  assaulted  and  carried  a  portion 
of  his  main  line,  capturing  both  works 


At  Nashville.  43 

and  guns.  Thereupon  the  infantry 
corps  again  advanced  on  the  front; 
the  enemy  was  everywhere  forced 
back  in  confused  retreat,  and  in- 
stantly the  most  vigorous  pursuit 
began,  and  was  kept  up  that  night  till 
midnight,  the  cavalry  leading.  It  was 
resumed  at  daylight  and  continued 
night  and  day  in  winter  weather, — rain, 
slush,  snow,  and  ice, — over  a  soggy 
country  and  mud  roads  which  were 
well-nigh  impassable,  leading  through  a 
region  which  both  armies  had  gleaned 
bare  with  their  foraging  parties.  But 
even  under  these  conditions,  by  hercu- 
lean efforts,  the  most  vigorous  pursuit 
was  prosecuted  to  the  Tennessee  River. 
The  determined  character  of  this  pur- 
suit is  well  illustrated  by  the  fact  that 


44  General  George  H.  Thomas 

6000  cavalry  horses  were  disabled,  so 
rapid  and  exhaustive  was  the  work 
they  performed.  At  the  close  Hood's 
army  was  practically  destroyed.  It 
opened  the  campaign  55,000  strong. 
It  lost  nearly  all  its  guns  and  equip- 
ments, about  15,000  killed  and 
wounded,  and  the  same  number  of 
prisoners.  About  13,000  men  of  all 
arms  were  finally  assembled  at  Tupelo. 
Starting  toward  North  Carolina  it 
continued  to  disintegrate,  and  reached 
the  southern  line  of  that  State  not 
over  6000  strong.  It  had  practically 
disappeared  as  an  army.  When  it 
reached  Bentonville  in  Sherman's 
front  it  went  into  action  with  only 
3953  officers  and  men  of  all  arms. 
For  the  first  time  in  the  war  one  of 


At  Nashville.  45 

the  leading  veteran  armies  of  the 
enemy  operating  in  the  open  field 
had  been  destroyed.  This  was  the 
direct  result  of  Thomas's  blow  at 
Nashville,  and  the  pursuit  which  fol- 
lowed. 

Thomas  was  very  deeply  pained  and 
indignant  at  the  treatment  he  received 
while  making  the  most  vigorous  prep- 
arations for  battle  which  it  was  pos- 
sible to  carry  forward.  He  called  his 
officers  together  during  the  sleet 
storm  to  tell  them  of  the  peremptory 
order  to  attack  without  regard  to 
weather,  and  of  his  reply  that  the 
conditions  were  unfavorable  for  at- 
tack, that  it  would  be  made  at  the 
first  possible  moment,  and  that  if 
removed,  as  threatened,  he  would  sub- 


46  General  George  H.  Thomas 

mit  without  a  murmur.  He  found 
himself  fully  supported  by  all  of  them. 
After  this  meeting  was  over  he  called 
General  Wilson  aside  and  said:  " Wil- 
son, they  treat  me  at  Washington  and 
at  Grant's  headquarters  as  though  I 
were  a  boy!  They  do  not  seem  to 
think  that  I  have  sense  enough  to  plan 
a  campaign  or  fight  a  battle,  but  if 
they  will  only  let  me  alone  a  few  days 
I  will  show  them  that  they  are  mis- 
taken. I  am  sure  we  will  whip  Hood 
and  destroy  his  army,  if  we  go  at  them 
under  favorable  instead  of  unfavorable 
conditions." 

Later,  and  in  spite  of  his  brilliant 
and  complete  victory,  and  the  further 
fact  that  such  vigorous  pursuit  as  had 
never  before  been  made  by  a  Union 


At  Nashville.  47 

army  was  in  progress,  in  midwinter 
and  under  more  unfavorable  circum- 
stances, too,  than  a  pursuing  army 
had  encountered  during  the  war,  this 
nagging  from  Washington  and  City 
Point  continued. 

Secretary  Stanton  alone  was  im- 
mediate, wholesouled,  and  continuing 
in  his  congratulations  and  praises. 
Grant  tempered  his  message  over 
the  "splendid  success"  with  the  in- 
formation that  he  had  reached  Wash- 
ington on  his  way  to  relieve  him, 
but  now  would  not  proceed,  and  con- 
tinued: "Push  the  enemy  now  and 
give  him  no  rest  until  he  is  entirely 
destroyed.  Much  is  now  expected." 
Mr.  Lincoln  added  to  his  thanks: 
"You  made  a  magnificent  beginning. 


4^  Central  George  H.  Thomas 

A  grand  consummation  is  within  your 
easy  reach.  Do  not  let  it  slip." 

In  the  midst  of  these  proddings, 
Secretary  Stanton  suggested  to  Grant 
that  Thomas  be  made  a  Major- 
General.  Grant  replied:  "I  think 
Thomas  has  won  the  Major-Gen- 
eralcy,  but  I  would  wait  a  few  days 
before  giving  it,  to  see  the  extent 
of  damage  done." 

Next  came  Halleck,  in  the  midst  of 
the  almost  superhuman  efforts  of  the 
pursuit: 

"  Permit  me,  General,  to  urge  the 
vast  importance  of  a  hot  pursuit  of 
Hood's  army.  Every  possible  sacri- 
fice should  be  made,  and  your  men  for 
a  few  days  will  submit  to  any  hard- 
ship and  privation  to  accomplish  the 


At  Nashville.  49 

great  result.  A  most  vigorous  pur- 
suit on  your  part  is  therefore  of  vital 
importance  to  Sherman's  plans.  No 
sacrifice  must  be  spared  to  attain  so 
important  an  object." 

THOMAS   TURNS   ON    HIS   NAGGERS. 

There  was  one  thing  in  which  Gen- 
eral Thomas  was  slow.  He  was  not 
swift  to  give  expression  to  indigna- 
tion over  wrong  treatment.  To  this 
latter,  as  the  culmination  of  the  series, 
he  at  last  responded  with  this  crush- 
ing statement: 

"  General  Hood's  army  is  being  pur- 
sued as  rapidly  and  as  vigorously  as 
it  is  possible  for  one  army  to  pursue 
another.  We  cannot  control  the  ele- 
ments, and  you  must  remember  that 


5°  General  George  H.  Thomas 

to  resist  Hood's  advance  into  Tennes- 
see I  had  to  reorganize  and  almost 
thoroughly  equip  the  force  now  under 
my  command.  I  fought  the  battles 
of  the  i5th  and  i6th  inst.  with  the 
troops  but  partially  equipped,  and 
notwithstanding  the  inclemency  of 
the  weather  and  the  partial  equipment, 
have  been  enabled  to  drive  the  enemy 
beyond  Duck  River,  crossing  the  two 
streams  with  my  troops,  and  driving 
the  enemy  from  position  to  position, 
without  the  aid  of  pontoons,  and  with 
but  little  transportation  to  bring  up 
supplies  and  ammunition. 

"  I  am  doing  all  in  my  power  to 
crush  Hood's  army,  and,  if  it  be  pos- 
sible, will  destroy  it,  but  pursuing  an 
enemy  through  an  exhausted  country, 


At  Nashville.  51 

over  mud  roads,  completely  sogged 
with  heavy  rains,  is  no  child's  play, 
and  cannot  be  accomplished  as  quickly 
as  thought  of.  I  hope,  in  urging  me 
to  push  the  enemy,  the  department 
remembers  that  General  Sherman  took 
with  him  the  complete  organizations 
of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, well  equipped  in  every  respect 
as  regards  ammunition,  supplies,  and 
transportation,  leaving  me  only  two 
corps — partially  stripped  of  their  trans- 
portation to  accommodate  the  force 
taken  with  him — to  oppose  the  advance 
into  Tennessee  of  that  army  which 
had  resisted  the  advance  of  the  army 
of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi on  Atlanta  from  the  com- 
mencement of  the  campaign  until  its 


52  General  George  H.  Thomas 

close,  and  which  is  now,  in  addition, 
aided  by  Forrest's  cavalry.  Although 
my  progress  may  appear  slow,  I  feel 
assured  that  Hood's  army  can  be 
driven  from  Tennessee,  and  eventu- 
ally driven  to  the  wall,  by  the  force 
under  my  command,  but  too  much 
must  not  be  expected  of  troops  which 
have  to  be  reorganized,  especially 
when  they  have  the  task  of  destroying 
a  force  in  a  winter  campaign  which 
was  able  to  make  an  obstinate  resist- 
ance to  twice  its  numbers  in  spring 
and  summer.  In  conclusion,  I  can 
safely  state  that  this  army  is  will- 
ing to  submit  to  any  sacrifice  to  oust 
Hood's  army,  or  to  strike  any  other 
blow  which  would  contribute  to  the 
destruction  of  the  rebellion." 


At  Nashville.  53 

The  next  day  Stanton  thus  again 
extended  his  steady  support: 

"I  have  seen  to-day  General  Hal- 
leek's  dispatch  of  yesterday  and  your 
reply.  It  is  proper  for  me  to  assure 
you  that  this  department  has  the 
most  unbounded  confidence  in  your 
skill,  vigor,  and  determination  to 
employ  to  the  best  advantage  all  the 
means  in  your  power  to  pursue  and 
destroy  the  enemy.  No  department 
could  be  inspired  with  more  profound 
admiration  and  thankfulness  for  the 
great  deeds  you  have  already  per- 
formed, or  more  confiding  faith  that 
human  effort  could  accomplish  no 
more  than  will  be  done  by  you  and 
the  gallant  officers  and  soldiers  of 
your  command." 


54  General  George  H.  Tbomas 

To  this  Thomas  responded  in  terms 
which  show  his  deep  appreciation  of 
the  only  unqualifiedly  friendly  voice 
that  had  reached  his  ear  from  those 
in  high  authority: 

"  I  am  profoundly  thankful  for  the 
hearty  expression  of  your  confidence 
in  my  determination  and  desire  to  do 
all  in  my  power  to  destroy  the  enemy 
and  put  down  the  rebellion." 

As  pertinent  to  this  history  it  is  well 
to  recall  two  facts:  First,  Sherman 
reached  Savannah,  having  avoided 
all  fortified  places,  had  encountered 
no  enemy  in  force  during  his  march, 
sat  down  before  the  city,  and  awoke 
one  morning  to  find  that  Hardee  with 
his  10,000  men  had  slipped  out  of  the 
city  over  the  river  and  escaped. 


At  Nasbville.  55 

Second,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
which  had  87,000  present  for  duty 
equipped,  and  which  was  not  obliged 
to  depend  upon  quartermasters'  em- 
ployees, citizens,  and  convalescents 
for  its  reserves,  remained  quietly  in 
its  camps  in  front  of  City  Point  and 
in  sight  of  the  enemy  from  November 
to  April,  giving  plenty  of  leisure  for 
complaining  that  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  did  not  attack  at  the 
dropping  of  a  handkerchief. 

With  the  dispersion  of  Hood's  army 
General  Thomas  set  about  preparing 
for  a  spring  campaign  which  should 
open  at  the  earliest  possible  day. 
His  plan  contemplated  the  assembling 
and  putting  in  thorough  condition 
an  army  of  cavalry  to  penetrate  the 


5  ^  General  George  H.  Thomas 

South  under  his  trusted  commander, 
General  James  H.  Wilson. 

THE    CAVALRY    AFTER    NASHVILLE. 

Six  divisions  of  the  cavalry  corps 
were  put  in  camp,  extending  for 
twelve  miles  along  the  north  bank  of 
the  Tennessee  from  Gravelly  Springs 
to  Waterloo  Landing.  A  winter  cam- 
paign was  laid  out  at  army  head- 
quarters for  Thomas's  army,  to  begin 
without  rest  or  refitting — the  resting 
to  be  done  by  proxy  in  the  vicinity  of 
City  Point.  But  owing  to  rains  and 
unusual  floods  this  plan  for  Thomas 
could  not  be  pursued,  and  the  time 
was  improved  for  a  vigorous  and 
rapid  refitting  of  his  forces. 

Early  in  March  a  cavalry  corps  of 


At  Nashville.  57 

27,000  had  been  gathered.  The  men 
were  veterans.  The  new  equipment 
collected  was  excellent,  but,  with  all 
that  the  Cavalry  Bureau  could  do, 
only  17,000  horses  could  be  provided. 
This  force  was  raised,  by  drills  and 
every  form  of  perfecting  an  organiza- 
tion, to  a  high  state  of  efficiency. 
While  vigorous  efforts  were  in  prog- 
ress to  equip  Hatch's  veteran  division 
of  10,000,  the  orders  from  Washing- 
ton and  City  Point  for  forward  move- 
ment began  to  pour  in  on  Thomas. 
While  no  other  national  army  was 
moving,  the  nine  weeks  of  midwinter 
which  Thomas  was  using  in  most 
active  measures  for  beginning  a  crush- 
ing campaign  were  begrudged  him, 
and  he  was  again  prodded  to  move 


5  8  General  George  H.  Thomas 

before  he  was  ready.  Next,  the 
breaking  up  of  the  cavalry  force 
which  had  been  assembled  and  pre- 
pared with  such  great  labor  began. 
One  division,  5000  strong,  was  or- 
dered off  to  Canby  at  Mobile,  where 
its  operations  proved  of  little  conse- 
quence, and  Thomas  was  ordered  with 
5000  more  to  make  a  demonstration 
on  Tuscaloosa  and  Selma. 

General  Wilson  then  urged  with 
great  ability  and  power  that  the  cav- 
alry should  go  as  a  body,  with  the 
purpose  of  destroying  the  various 
factories  of  war  material  and  breaking 
the  interior  lines  of  communication 
and  supply.  Grant,  who  had  great 
confidence  in  Wilson  from  his  long 
service  on  his  staff,  consented,  and  the 


At  Nashville.  59 

plan,  warmly  approved  by  Thomas, 
was  adopted,  and  Wilson  was  started 
with  all  the  powers  of  an  independent 
commander. 

On  the  22d  of  March  Wilson  had 
crossed  the  Tennessee  and  started 
toward  Selma.  He  had  three  di- 
visions, Upton's,  Long's,  and  E.  M. 
McCook's.  The  aggregate  strength 
was  12,500  mounted,  and  1500  dis- 
mounted to  follow  till  they  could 
be  furnished  with  captured  horses. 
It  was  in  every  sense  a  command 
thoroughly  equipped  and  fully  sup- 
plied. The  divisions  marched  on  dif- 
ferent roads,  but  the  objective  of 
each  was  Selma.  The  direct  distance 
was  180  miles,  and  the  average  march 
of  each  division  to  reach  it  was  250 


60  General  George  H.  Thomas 

miles.  The  streams  were  still  flooded 
in  all  directions,  and  the  roads  deep 
and  difficult.  The  vigor  and  skill 
with  which  all  these  obstacles  were 
overcome  form  a  brilliant  chapter, 
not  exceeded  in  kind  during  the  war. 
At  Montevallo,  forty-five  miles  from 
Selma,  a  portion  of  Forrest's  com- 
mand was  encountered,  and,  after  a 
dashing  fight,  forced  to  retreat.  The 
Southern  leader  had  not  been  able,  as 
yet,  to  concentrate  his  command. 
The  capture  of  a  courier  with  dis- 
patches to  Forrest  showed  Wilson 
how  several  columns  were  moving  to 
join  Forrest,  and  forces  were  sent  in 
various  directions  to  check  them, 
while  Wilson's  main  column  rode 
direct  for  Selma.  It  was  an  exciting 


At  Nashville.  61 

and  successful  play.  Forrest,  when 
reached,  was  found  to  have  made  the 
best  disposition  possible  for  an  in- 
ferior force,  and  maintained  a  stub- 
born resistance.  But  the  Union 
troopers  charged  at  all  points.  For- 
rest himself  fought  hand  to  hand, 
and  received  several  saber  strokes. 
After  the  lines  were  carried  Wilson's 
column  advanced  in  pursuit  twenty- 
five  miles,  and  bivouacked  at  night 
only  twenty  miles  from  Selma. 

Selma  contained  a  gun  foundry, 
arsenal,  and  important  manufactories 
of  war  material.  The  place  had  been 
sufficiently  fortified,  as  was  believed, 
against  any  possible  cavalry  attack. 
General  Wilson  had  succeeded  in  ob- 
taining accurate  plans  of  these  works 


62  General  George  H.  Thomas 

and  of  the  grounds  in  front  of  them. 
During  the  day's  advance,  which  was 
not  retarded  by  Forrest,  these  sketches 
were  shown  to  all  general  officers  and 
a  plan  of  attack  explained.  As  a 
result,  upon  reaching  the  vicinity  of 
the  works,  the  various  brigades  went 
into  position  with  precision  and  celer- 
ity, and  the  storming  of  the  in- 
trenchments  began  at  once.  Just  as 
darkness  was  gathering  they  were 
carried  at  every  point.  The  resist- 
ance was  stubborn,  but  numbers,  effi- 
cient organization,  equipment,  and 
dash  won  the  day  and  the  city. 

The  capture  of  Selma  was  one  of 
the  most  remarkable  feats  in  the 
cavalry  annals  of  any  land.  The 
works  contained  24  bastions  and  a 


At  Nashville.  63 

number  of  strong  redans  with  deep 
ditches,  while  the  curtains  of  the  four- 
mile  line  were  generally  stockaded 
rifle  pits.  There  was  besides  an  in- 
terior line  of  4  detached  forts.  The 
artillery  armament  of  these  works 
was  30  field  guns  and  two  thirty- 
pounder  Parrotts.  Wilson's  attack- 
ing force  was  8000.  Forrest,  for 
the  defense,  had  half  that  force  of 
veteran  cavalry,  and  some  2000  militia, 
home-guards,  and  citizens.  The  cap- 
tures were  2700  prisoners,  nearly  2000 
horses,  32  guns  in  service,  26  field 
guns  mounted  complete  in  arsenal, 
46  siege  guns  in  the  foundry,  66,000 
rounds  of  artillery  ammunition,  and 
100,000  rounds  for  small  arms.  Gen- 
eral Wilson  destroyed  the  Selma  arse- 


64  General  George  H.  Tbomas 

nal,  with  44  buildings  covering  13 
acres,  filled  with  machinery  and 
munitions;  powder  works  comprising 
7  buildings,  with  14,000  pounds  of 
powder;  niter  works,  with  18  buildings 
equipped,  3  gun  foundries,  3  rolling 
mills,  and  several  machine  shops,  all 
equipped  and  turning  out  material 
of  war,  and  vast  accumulations  of 
quartermaster  and  commissary  stores. 
It  was  a  crushing  blow  to  the  Con- 
federacy— this  capture  of  Selma  with 
its  enormous  military  plant  on  Sunday, 
April  2.  The  same  day  Grant,  at  the 
other  end  of  the  line  a  thousand  miles 
away,  had  broken  the  lines  at  Peters- 
burg, and  the  evacuation  of  Rich- 
mond began. 


At  Nashville.  65 

THE   CAPTURE   OF    MONTGOMERY. 

General  Wilson's  command  re- 
mained at  Selma  about  a  week,  making 
active  preparations  for  its  next  stroke, 
which  was  to  be  against  Montgomery, 
the  former  capital  of  the  Confeder- 
acy. It  was  necessary  to  prepare  a 
thousand  feet  of  bridging  to  cross  the 
Alabama  River,  then  at  flood  tide  and 
filled  with  floating  debris.  Equip- 
ments of  every  kind  were  looked  after 
and  the  most  careful  refitting  of  the 
whole  command  took  place,  the  Con- 
federate stores  taken  offering  abund- 
ant facilities  for  such  important  work. 
There  had  been  horses  enough  cap- 
tured to  mount  the  whole  command, 
together  with  a  very  considerable 


66  General  George  H.  Thomas 

force  of  negroes  for  fatigue  purposes. 
With  Croxton's  brigade  detached 
and  moving  by  a  circuitous  route 
from  central  Alabama,  through  north- 
ern Georgia  toward  Macon,  the  final 
objective,  the  force  of  the  main  col- 
umn was  reduced  to  11,000  men. 

Upon  reaching  the  outskirts  of 
Montgomery  they  were  met  by  the 
officials  of  the  town  and  leading 
citizens,  offering  surrender  without 
conditions.  Then  followed  an  aston- 
ishment for  the  people  of  this  capital. 
The  whole  force,  marching  in  close 
column,  with  its  flags  unfurled  and 
music  playing,  made  its  way  into  and 
through  the  city  without  a  marauder 
leaving  its  column  or  a  soldier  entering 
a  private  house  in  any  quarter  unin- 


At  Nashville.  67 

vited.  And,  so  far  as  information 
came  to  the  officers  of  the  command, 
not  an  insulting  word  was  spoken.  The 
main  portion  of  the  command  camped 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  city,  while  its 
advance  continued  rapidly  toward 
Columbus,  skirmishing  with  the  re- 
treating enemy.  There  was  a  very 
considerable  capture  of  steamboats 
loaded  with  military  supplies  at  Mont- 
gomery. The  halt  there,  however,  was 
only  for  the  night,  and  the  next  day  the 
main  column  moved  with  the  greatest 
celerity  so  as  to  secure  a  bridge  for 
crossing  the  Chattahoochee  either  at 
Columbus  on  the  direct  road  to  Macon, 
or  at  West  Point,  further  up  the  river. 
By  rapid  movements,  and  bold  and 
most  brilliant  fighting,  both  the 


68  General  George  H.  Thomas 

bridge  at  Columbus  and  that  at  West 
Point  were  captured.  Though  both 
were  prepared  for  burning  and  pro- 
tected by  heavy  fortifications  well 
manned  by  a  defending  force,  the 
attacks  against  these  were  pushed  so 
vigorously  as  to  make  it  impossible 
for  the  enemy  to  fire  them. 

The  bridge-head  at  West  Point  was 
protected  by  a  strong  redoubt  with  a 
deep  ditch  mounting  two  guns,  one 
a  thirty-two  pounder,  and  the  work 
manned  by  265  men.  This  was  twice 
attacked  by  direct  assault,  and  carried 
the  second  time.  The  captures  were 
3  guns,  500  stands  of  small  arms,  19 
locomotive  engines,  and  240  cars 
loaded  with  army  supplies,  but  the 
greatest  importance  of  securing  a 


At  Nasboille.  69 

crossing  at  West  Point  was  that  it 
opened  a  way  direct  to  Macon,  which 
could  be  used  for  the  entire  cavalry 
corps  in  case  the  attack  at  Columbus 
should  fail. 

The  main  column  arrived  at  Girard, 
a  small  town  opposite  Columbus, 
early  in  the  afternoon,  finding  a  heavy 
line  of  fortifications  protecting  three 
bridges  across  the  Chattahoochee. 
Under  a  vigorous  attack  upon  the 
lower  bridge  the  Confederates  found 
it  impossible  to  save  it  from  capture 
unless  it  was  destroyed,  and  set  fire 
to  the  cotton  and  turpentine  with 
which  it  had  been  prepared  for 
burning. 

It  was  then  decided  to  make  a  night 
attack  upon  the  central  bridge,  and 


7°  General  George  H.  Thomas 

the  troops  were  arranged  for  this  des- 
perate work.  The  lines  were  very 
quietly  formed,  and  moved  up  to 
within  range  of  the  intrenchments, 
and  at  a  signal  the  assault  began. 
The  works  were  found  to  be  strong 
and  thoroughly  protected  with  ditches 
and  slashed  timber.  The  enemy, 
while  watchful,  was  not  expecting  a 
night  assault  from  troops  that  had 
not  reconnoitered  the  fortifications  by 
daylight.  They  opened  fire  upon  the 
charging  columns,  but  in  the  dark- 
ness it  was  necessarily  wild  and  un- 
certain. 

The  Union  troops  went  over  the 
works  at  many  points,  and  all  rushed 
in  haste  toward  the  bridge,  which  was 
the  objective  point  of  the  attack.  It 


At  Nashville.  7 1 

was  one  of  the  most  desperate  and 
persistent  night  fights  of  the  war,  but 
so  thoroughly  organized  was  the  at- 
tacking force  that  in  spite  of  the  dark- 
ness and  confusion  it  was  able  to 
move  with  sufficient  unity  to  preserve 
its  columns  and  formations.  Upon 
the  penetration  of  the  works  both 
Union  and  Confederate  soldiers  swept 
over  the  bridge  toward  Columbus, 
and  this  was  so  crowded  with  the  men 
of  both  forces  that  the  enemy  hold- 
ing the  works  at  the  east  end  of  the 
bridge,  and  commanding  it  with  artil- 
lery, were  restrained  from  firing  till 
the  Union  forces  made  a  rush  upon 
them  and  gained  possession,  and 
Columbus  was  in  full  possession  of 
General  Wilson's  forces. 


72  General  George  H.  Thomas 

The  next  morning  it  was  ascer- 
tained that  the  works  had  been 
manned  and  defended  by  3000  Geor- 
gia militia  under  Generals  How- 
ell  Cobb  and  Toombs.  The  capture 
of  the  city  resulted  in  the  de- 
struction of  a  great  quantity  of  war 
material,  over  60  guns,  the  ram 
Jackson,  mounting  6  guns,  a  large 
number  of  small  arms,  125,000  bales 
of  cotton,  15  locomotives,  250  cars,  a 
navy  yard  and  armory,  2  rolling  mills, 
i  arsenal  and  nitre  works,  2  pow- 
der magazines,  2  iron  works,  3 
foundries,  10  mills  and  factories  turn- 
ing out  war  material,  100,000  rounds 
of  artillery  ammunition,  and  a  great 
quantity  of  machinery  used  in  the 
manufacture  of  war  material. 


At  Nashville.  73 

THE   CAVALRY    AT    COLUMBUS. 

Columbus  was  the  great  manufac- 
turing center  of  the  Confederacy,  and 
this  destruction  inflicted  irreparable 
damage.  While  little  was  known  at 
the  North  of  this  sweep  of  Wilson's 
columns  through  the  industrial  cen- 
ters and  military  storehouses  of  the 
Confederacy,  it  is  easy  to  understand 
that  these  fatal  blows  at  vital  points 
of  interior  military  supply  added  to 
the  demoralization  and  discourage- 
ment attending  the  evacuation  of 
Richmond  and  the  gathering  storm 
about  the  armies  of  Lee  and  Johnson. 

The  column  moved  swiftly  for 
Macon,  and  about  eighteen  miles 
out  from  it  the  officer  in  advance 


74  General  George  H.  Thomas 

was  met  with  a  flag  of  truce  carry- 
ing a  note  from  General  Beaure- 
gard  notifying  the  commander  of 
the  forces  of  General  Sherman's 
truce  with  General  Johnston,  stating 
that  an  agreement  had  been  entered 
upon  that  the  contending  forces  were 
to  occupy  their  present  positions  till 
forty-eight  hours'  notice  had  been 
given  of  the  resumption  of  hostilities. 
As  General  Wilson  was  eight  or  ten 
miles  in  the  rear  with  his  main  com- 
mand, the  note  was  sent  to  him,  and 
the  officer  in  the  advance  pushed  to  and 
into  Macon,  taking  possession  of  the 
city.  When  General  Wilson  arrived  in 
the  city  he  went  at  once  to  the  city  hall, 
where  Generals  Howell  Cobb,  Gus- 
tavus  W.  Smith,  and  others  had  been 


At  Nashville.  75 

confined.  General  Cobb  demanded 
that  he  and  his  command  should  be 
released,  and  that  General  Wilson 
should  retire  to  where  the  flag  of 
truce  had  met  his  advance.  General 
Wilson  declared  that  after  receiving 
the  note  he  had  lost  no  time  in  push- 
ing on  to  the  head  of  his  column,  and 
found  it  in  full  possession  of  the  city. 
He  could  not  accept  notification  of  a 
truce  through  the  Confederate  author- 
ities, as  they  were  not  his  channel  of 
communication  with  General  Sher- 
man, and  ended  the  conference  by  a 
positive  refusal  to  acknowledge  the 
armistice,  to  retire  from  the  town,  or 
to  release  his  prisoners.  When  he 
announced  this  decision  he  said  to 
General  Cobb  that  he  could  conceive 


76  General  George  H.   Thomas 

of  but  one  adequate  reason  for  the 
truce,  and  that  was  that  Lee's  army 
had  surrendered.  Cobb,  however, 
declined  to  give  any  information,  but 
General  Smith,  to  whom  Wilson  ad- 
dressed the  same  remark,  answered 
that  Lee  had  surrendered,  and  that 
peace  would  soon  follow.  Thereupon 
General  Wilson  announced  his  deci- 
sion to  remain  at  Macon  and  conduct 
his  future  operations  upon  the  prin- 
ciple that  every  man  killed  thereafter 
was  a  man  murdered. 

This  interview  was  held  on  the  2oth 
of  April  just  before  midnight,  and  was 
the  first  definite  knowledge  which 
Wilson's  column  had  obtained  of  the 
events  which  had  occurred  in  Virginia. 

The  surrender  at   Macon  included 


At  Nashville.  ^^ 

a  large  number  of  small  guns  and 
a  great  quantity  of  military  stores 
and  supplies.  The  next  day  the  Con- 
federate authorities  opened  communi- 
cation over  their  own  telegraph  lines 
between  Wilson  and  Sherman,  and  the 
former  received  orders  from  the  lat- 
ter to  desist  from  hostilities  pending 
an  armistice.  Soon  after  he  re- 
ceived orders  from  the  Secretary  of 
War,  through  Thomas,  to  disregard 
this  armistice  and  resume  operations, 
but  before  this  order  reached  him  he 
learned  that  Johnston  had  surren- 
dered all  the  Confederate  forces  east 
of  the  Mississippi,  and  that  peace 
was  assured. 

The  closing  act  of  General  Wilson's 
campaign  was  the  capture  of  Jefferson 


?8  General  George  H.  Thomas 

Davis  by  regiments  from  his  com- 
mand. Thus  ended  the  most  noted 
cavalry  movement  of  the  war. 

The  above  is  of  necessity  a  very 
concise  presentation  of  the  salient 
points  of  General  Wilson's  remarka- 
ble campaign,  conducted  alone  by 
mounted  troops.  It  is  not  claimed 
that  the  account  is  new.  I  have  pub- 
lished it  heretofore  in  extended  form, 
though  not  in  the  press.  This  briefer 
story  cannot  but  be  a  repetition  of 
the  facts  and  a  synopsis  of  the  fuller 
statement  of  them.  It  is  a  chapter 
in  our  war  history  than  which  no 
other  is  more  replete  with  thrilling 
and  brilliant  incident,  with  skillful 
planning,  and  bold  and  successful  ex- 
ecution. No  purely  cavalry  campaign 


At  Nashville.  79 

in  our  war  approached  it  in  these 
features.  It  is  doubtful  whether  its 
parallel  can  be  found  in  the  cavalry 
annals  of  any  modern  nation.  And  to 
this  general  statement  should  be  added 
that  the  officer  who  commanded  it, 
who  was  its  organizer  and  its  con- 
trolling spirit,  the  one  upon  whom 
General  George  H.  Thomas  leaned  as 
one  of  his  most  trusted  lieutenants 
and  advisers,  was  only  twenty-seven 
years  old. 

It  is  not  strange  that  Lee's  and 
Johnston's  surrender  fixed  the  atten- 
tion of  the  country  and  turned  it 
away  from  General  Wilson's  campaign. 
Had  these  two  events  been  delayed  a 
month  the  land  would  have  rung  with 
Wilson's  praises  and  with  new  honors 


&°  General  George  H.  Thomas 

for  General  Thomas.  Indeed,  had 
the  withdrawal  from  Richmond  and 
the  events  which  so  quickly  followed 
it  been  only  delayed  in  their  begin- 
ning by  a  few  days  necessary  to  have 
informed  the  country  of  Wilson's  mar- 
velous successes,  it  is  certain  that  his 
breaking  up  of  these  interior  store- 
houses of  military  material,  and  the 
destruction  of  these  many  plants  for 
producing  more,  would  have  insepa- 
rably and  largely  connected  them- 
selves in  the  minds  of  the  people  with 
the  eastern  surrender  as  cause  and 
effect. 

It  was  a  campaign  whose  success 
would  have  been  the  same  had  Lee 
been  able  to  hold  on  to  Richmond, 
and  had  Johnston  so  eluded  Sherman 


At  Nashville.  81 

as  to  prolong  the  contest  in  Virginia 
and  North  Carolina. 

THOMAS'S    PLAN    THOUGHT    OUT   AND 
FOLLOWED. 

From  the  first  this  cavalry  cam- 
paign had  proceeded  according  to  a 
clearly  formed  plan.  It  was  made 
after  full  conference  with  General 
Wilson.  First,  it  was  decided  that  to 
render  an  attack  upon  Hood's  line 
certain  of  success  a  sufficient  cavalry 
force  must  be  in  hand  to  turn  his 
flank.  The  next  requirement,  that 
of  pursuing  so  effectively  as  to  break 
up  Hood,  could  not  be  met  with- 
out sufficient  cavalry.  So  General 
Thomas  held  on  in  the  face  of  what 
has  been  related  till  he  was  so  nearly 


82  General  George  H.  Thomas 

ready  to  strike  that  he  felt  certain 
of  success.  As  a  result,  the  ends  in 
view  were  attained.  The  cavalry 
flanking  circuits  made  possible  the 
driving  of  the  enemy  from  his  ex- 
tended position.  The  pursuit  by  a 
thoroughly  equipped  cavalry  force 
made  possible  and  secured  the  virtual 
destruction  of  Hood's  army. 

The  next  campaign,  urged  by  Wil- 
son and  approved  by  Thomas,  had  for 
its  objective  the  destruction  of  the 
military  storehouses  and  manufac- 
tories, and  the  fatal  crippling  of  the 
Confederacy.  How  complete  was 
the  success  of  this  second  campaign 
the  outlines  already  presented  suffi- 
ciently attest. 

In    summarizing    this    attempt    to 


At  Nashville.  83 

again  direct  attention  to  this  wonder- 
ful cavalry  campaign,  it  may  be  per- 
missible to  repeat  the  form  in  which 
I  have  heretofore  set  it  forth  in 
a  volume  (the  concluding  chapters 
of  Colonel  Bonn  Piatt's  "Life  of 
Thomas ")  covering  the  ground  of 
this  article  at  much  greater  length: 

It  should  be  remembered  forever  in 
the  annals  of  war  that  Thomas  insisted 
upon  waiting  to  remount  a  portion  of 
the  (cavalry)  corps  before  he  would 
consent  to  deliver  battle,  and  that 
when  he  did  march  forth  against  the 
veteran  and  almost  invincible  infantry 
of  Hood,  strongly  intrenched  in  his 
front,  it  was  the  cavalry  corps  which 
broke  through  his  left,  and  wheeling 
grandly  in  the  same  direction,  cap- 


84  General  George  H.  Thomas 

tured  twenty-seven  guns  from  their 
redoubts  on  the  first  day,  and  which, 
continuing  its  movement  on  the  sec- 
ond day,  enveloped  and  took  in  re- 
verse the  left  and  left  center  of  the 
Confederate  intrench'ments,  and  so 
shook  their  entire  line  as  to  make  it 
a  walkover  for  the  infantry  which 
Thomas  finally  hurled  against  them. 
It  was  the  harrassing  pursuit  of  Hood 
by  the  cavalry  corps  which,  notwith- 
standing the  rains  and  sleet  of  mid- 
winter and  the  swollen  rivers,  broke 
up  and  scattered  the  host  which  had 
so  confidently  invaded  Middle  Ten- 
nessee only  a  month  before.  Pausing 
on  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee  till  the 
rough  edge  of  winter  had  passed,  to 
gather  in  the  distant  detachments,  to 


At  Nashville.  85 

procure  remounts,  clothing,  and  equip- 
ments, and  to  weld  the  growing  force 
into  a  compact  and  irresistible  army 
corps  of  horsemen,  the  cavalry  com- 
mander, with  the  full  concurrence  of 
Thomas,  the  beau  ideal  of  American 
soldiers,  began  his  final  and  most  glori- 
ous campaign.  No  historian  or  mili- 
tary critic  can  read  the  story  of  the 
operations  which  followed  without 
coming  to  the  conclusion  that  they 
were  characterized  by  the  most  re- 
markable series  of  successes  ever 
gained  by  cavalry  in  modern  warfare. 
They  illustrate,  first,  the  importance 
of  concentrating  that  arm  in  compact 
masses  under  one  competent  com- 
mander, and  in  operations  of  the  first 
importance;  second,  the  tremendous 


86  General  George  H.  Thomas 

advantage  of  celerity  of  movement, 
especially  in  modern  warfare,  where 
improved  firearms  play  such  a  decisive 
part;  third,  that  the  chief  use  of 
horses,  notwithstanding  that  they  may 
in  exceptional  cases  add  to  the  shock 
of  the  charge,  is  to  transport  fighting 
men  rapidly  to  the  vital  point  of  a 
battlefield,  and  especially  to  the  flank 
and  rear  of  the  enemy's  position,  or 
deeply  into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's 
country  against  his  lines  of  supply 
and  communication,  and  also  his  arse- 
nals, armories,  and  factories;  fourth, 
that  the  best  infantry  armed  with  the 
best  magazine  carbines  or  rifles  make 
the  best  mounted  troops,  irrespective 
of  whether  they  be  called  cavalry, 
dragoons,  or  mounted  infantry. 


At  Nashville.  87 

When  the  fact  is  recalled  that  the 
seven  divisions  of  this  corps  at  the 
close  of  the  war  mustered  about 
35,000  men  for  duty  with  the  colors, 
and  that  had  the  war  lasted  sixty  days 
longer  they  could,  and  probably 
would,  have  been  concentrated  in 
Virginia,  it  will  be  seen  to  what  a 
high  degree  of  perfection  the  organi- 
zation had  been  brought,  and  that  it 
fully  justified  Sherman's  declaration 
that  it  was  by  far  the  largest,  most 
efficient,  and  most  powerful  body  of 
horse  that  had  ever  come  under  his 
command.  But  when  the  captures  of 
the  strongly  fortified  towns  of  Selma, 
West  Point,  and  Columbus  are  con- 
sidered, with  all  the  romantic  inci- 
dents of  night  fighting,  together  with 


88  General  George  H.  Thomas 

the  surrender  of  the  no  less  strongly 
fortified  cities  and  towns  of  Mont- 
gomery, Macon,  and  West  Point,  car- 
rying with  them  the  destruction  of  the 
last  and  only  remaining  arsenals, 
armories,  factories,  storehouses,  and 
military  munitions  and  supplies,  and 
also  the  destruction  of  the  railways 
connecting  those  places  with  their 
bridges  and  rolling  stock,  it  will  be 
seen  that  Johnston  and  his  generals 
had  nothing  else  left  them  but  to 
lay  down  their  arms  and  surrender. 
It  was  no  longer  possible  for  them 
to  concentrate  an  army,  or  to  sup- 
ply it  with  food,  or  to  keep  it  armed 
and  equipped.  With  those  places 
and  the  manufacturing  plants  which 
they  contained  still  in  their  pos- 


At  Nashville.  89 

session,  and  with  the  railways  con- 
necting them  still  unbroken,  they 
might  have  collected  together  in  the 
Carolinas  a  force  amply  able  to  cope 
with  Sherman,  and  possibly  to  over- 
whelm him  before  reinforcements 
could  reach  him.  That  brilliant  but 
erratic  leader,  with  his  splendid  army, 
it  will  be  remembered,  had  avoided 
Macon  on  the  one  hand  and  Augusta 
on  the  other,  both  the  seats  of  im- 
portant military  industries,  and  by  an 
eccentric  and  unnecessary  movement 
from  his  true  line  of  operations,  had 
gone  to  Savannah,  leaving  the  direct 
railroads  and  highways  behind  him 
open  and  free  for  the  use  of  the  rem- 
nants of  Hood's  army  and  of  the 
other  scattered  detachments  which 


9°  General  George  H.  Thomas 

were  hastening  to  form  a  junction 
with  Johnston,  now  the  sole  hope  of 
the  Confederacy. 

Had  it  not  been  for  Wilson's  wide 
swath  of  victory  and  destruction 
through  and  not  around  the  impor- 
tant cities  in  his  way,  during  which 
he  captured  8500  prisoners  and  280 
guns,  and  afterward  paroled  59,000 
rebel  soldiers  belonging  to  the  armies 
of  Lee,  Johnston,  and  Beauregard, 
it  would  have  been  easy  for  John- 
ston and  Beauregard,  had  they 
been  so  minded,  to  continue  the 
war  indefinitely.  As  it  was,  to  con- 
tinue it  was  simply  impossible,  and 
for  this  the  country  is  indebted,  first, 
to  Wilson  and  his  gallant  troopers, 
and  second,  to  Thomas,  who  insisted 


At  Nashville.  91 

that  they  should  have  time  to  re- 
mount and  prepare  for  the  work  be- 
fore them.  Neither  the  army  nor  the 
country  ever  appreciated  that  invinci- 
ble body  of  horsemen,  or  their  divi- 
sion, brigade, regimental,  and  company 
commanders,  or  the  high  character  of 
the  enlisted  men,  or  the  performances 
of  the  whole  at  their  real  worth. 
There  were  officers  among  them  fit 
for  any  command  that  could  have  been 
given  them,  and  as  a  body  they  were 
as  gallant  and  capable  soldiers  as  ever 
drew  saber  or  wore  uniform.  Had 
the  war  lasted  a  few  months  longer 
their  fame  would  have  been  a  house- 
hold word.  The  leaders,  though 
young  in  years,  were  old  in  war. 
Wilson  himself  was  at  the  close  not 


92  General  George  H.  Thomas 

yet  twenty-eight.  Kilpatrick  was 
about  the  same  age.  Upton  was 
several  months  younger.  Winslow, 
Alexander,  Croxton,  La  Grange, 
Watkins,  Atkins,  Murray,  Palmer, 
Noble,  Kitchell,  Benteen,  Cooper, 
Young,  Bacon,  and  Weston  were  of  the 
younger  set,  while  McCook,  Minty, 
Long,  Hatch,  R.  W.  Johnson,  Knipe, 
Kelly,  Hammond,  Coon,  G.  M.  L. 
Johnson,  Spalding,  Pritchard,  Miller, 
Harrison,  Biggs,  Vail,  Israel  Garrard, 
McCormick,  Pierce,  and  Frank  White 
were  somewhat  older,  though  none  of 
them  had  reached  middle  life.  Harn- 
den,  as  sturdy  as  Balfour  of  Burleigh, 
and  Eggleston,  the  type  of  those  who 
rode  with  Cromwell  at  Marston  Moor, 
were  graybeards,  but  were  full  of 


At  Nashville.  93 

activity  and  courage.  Ross  Hill  and 
Taylor,  although  captains,  were  mere 
boys,  but  full  of  experienced  valor. 

The  men  in  the  ranks  were  mostly 
from  the  Western  and  Northwestern 
and  upper  slave  States,  and  of  them 
it  may  be  truthfully  averred  that  their 
superiors  for  endurance,  self-reliance, 
and  pluck  could  nowhere  be  found. 
After  they  were  massed  at  Nashville 
they  believed  themselves  to  be  in- 
vincible, and  it  was  their  boast  that 
they  had  never  come  in  sight  of  a 
hostile  gun  or  fortification  that  they 
did  not  capture.  Armed  with  Spen- 
cers, it  was  their  conviction  that 
elbow  to  elbow,  dismounted,  in  single 
line,  nothing  could  withstand  their 
charge.  "  Only  cover  our  flanks," 


94  General  George  H.   Thomas 

said  Miller  to  Wilson,  as  they  were 
approaching  Selma,  "  and  nothing  can 
stop  us  !  "  In  conclusion,  it  may  be 
safely  said  that  no  man  ever  saw  one 
of  them  in  the  closing  campaign  of 
the  war  skulking  before  battle  or 
sneaking  to  the  rear  after  the  action 
began.  They  seemed  to  know  by 
instinct  when  and  where  the  enemy 
might  be  encountered,  and  then  the 
only  strife  among  them  was  to  see 
who  should  be  first  in  the  onset. 
With  a  corps  of  such  men,  properly 
mounted  and  armed,  and  with  such 
organization  and  discipline  as  pre- 
vailed among  them  during  their  last 
great  campaign,  no  hazard  of  war  can 
be  regarded  as  too  great  for  them 
to  undertake,  and  nothing  should 


At  Nashville.  95 

be     counted    as     impossible     except 
defeat. 

When  the  "  records  "  are  all  pub- 
lished and  the  story  properly  written, 
it  will  show  that  no  corps  in  the  army, 
whether  cavalry  or  infantry,  ever  in- 
flicted greater  injury  upon  the  "Lost 
Cause,"  or  did  more  useful  service 
toward  the  re-establishment  of  the 
Union  under  the  Constitution  and  the 
laws,  than  was  done  by  the  cavalry 
corps  of  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi. 


THE   END. 


TVASION  OF  TENNESSEE. 


601 


still  at  Duck  River.  Thus  night  closed  down 
upon  the  solitary  division,  on  whose  boldness  of 
action  devolved  the  safety  of  the  whole  force 
which  Sherman  had  spared  from  his  march  to 
the  sea  to  breast  the  tide  of  Hood's  invasion. 


MAJOR-GENERAL    A.    J.    SMITH.       (FROM    A    PHOTOGRAPH.) 

is  driven  When  night  came,  the  danger  rather  increased 
'himself  than  diminished.  A  single  Confederate  bri- 
lying  his  gade,  like  Adams's  or  Cockrell's  or  Maney's, — 


